To gain Taiwan’s original roll-call vote dataset, researchers interested in the dataset should contact the Center for Legislative Studies from the Department of Political Science, 
Soochow University (http://cls.idc.scu.edu.tw/), or apply the dataset vis this form: https://reurl.cc/Ep3edv.

In this file, I have four spreadsheets (excel) for identifying defection behavior and calculating the deviation (or defection) rate.
Here are the rules for how I dealt with the data.

First, I excluded unanimous roll calls (all MPs agree or disagree) from the analyses because they should be less important. 
 
Second, I considered only those votes where at least one-third of party members cast votes and at least one-half of those voted either yea or nay. 
When there is a low attendance rate among party members, such a roll-call vote should be less important—for instance, vote for an incidental motion.

Third, there is a so-called “collective absence in some cases.” That means the party whip decided all party members should be absent from the meeting (for expressing dissatisfaction with the procedure or decision). 
However, some party members still attended the meeting and voted. Some of them were representatives to present their party’s position. 
Although the majority party members were “absent from the meeting,” it did not show a clear party position. “Absence is not a position but a signal.” 
Even if some party members (e.g., some were party whips) presented and voted, they were not viewed as “defections” when majority party members were absent from voting.

Fourth, some legislators quit their jobs due to many reasons (such as bribery, crime, death, or serving as a minister) during their tenure, and new members filled the vacancies through by-election or substitution on the party list. 
But, I considered only party-affiliated legislators who cast more than ten votes during their tenure. This approach eliminates a few legislators who had a short voting record due to the reasons mentioned above. 
Thus, I count the proportion of votes in which a legislator defected from the party line while in tenure to include these cases. 

Finally, the Speaker and Vice Speaker are also excluded from this analysis because they only vote to break the tie and have a short voting record.

I have three different versions of the defection rate. 
1. Voting against only; Type I defection.
2. Voting against and abstention (abstain); Type II defection rate.
3. Voting against, abstention (abstain), and absence; Type III defection rate. However, as presented in the article, most cases of defection are “absence” after the electoral reform. 
   There is also a low positive correlation between Type II and Type III defection. In the analysis of the regressional model, I analyzed the “absence rate,” not Type III defection. 


